Contemplative Pedagogy and Mindfulness:

Developing Creative Attention in an Age of

Distraction by O'Donnell, Aislinn
Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2015
Contemplative Pedagogy and Mindfulness:
Developing Creative Attention in an Age of
Distraction
AISLINN O’DONNELL
Over the last decade, there has been a considerable expansion
of mindfulness programmes into a number of different domains
of contemporary life, such as corporations, schools, hospitals
and even the military. Understanding the reasons for this
phenomenon involves, I argue, reflecting upon the nature of
contemporary capitalism and mapping the complexity of
navigating new digital technologies that make multiple and
accelerated solicitations upon attention and our affective lives.
Whilst acknowledging the benefits of mindfulness practice, this
article argues that it is equally important to attend to the
ethical framework that gives orientation to these practices and
the outer conditions that shape lived daily experience, such as
school or work environments. I suggest that the well-meaning
efforts to secularise mindfulness, provide scientific evidence
for its effectiveness, and introduce it to wider publics may have
served to impoverish the rich contribution that practices of
mindfulness, situated within a broader ethical framework, can
make to human lives, and arguably contribute to the
educational endeavour. For example, the emphasis on
transforming inner conditions of students’ lives can lead to the
neglect of outer conditions, such as structural inequality, or
unhealthy and exploitative work practices. This can result in
practices that privilege individual wellbeing over compassion
and concern for the happiness of others, providing a buffer
against loving attention to the world and others. Instead, I ask
how mindfulness in educational settings could come to be
viewed in a different light if we reflect upon the ways in which
school environments and curricula can promote mindfulness,
awareness, sensitive inquiry, and contemplative practices
through the day, rather than offering it as a discrete
intervention focused on the self and wellbeing.
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INTRODUCTION: IS THERE A PROBLEMWITH MINDFULNESS?
The introduction of mindfulness and meditation programmes across a
wide range of institutions and organisations, including schools, is a well-
documented phenomenon. These programmes are sometimes seen to con-
stitute another part of the array of what Bernard Stiegler calls psycho-
technologies, as they too are concerned with the most intimate domain
of our existence, our psychic lives, yet their relationship with capitalism
and commodification has become a cause for concern. In light of this phe-
nomenon, we might ask whether mindfulness has been co-opted as a coping
technique in a world of information and sensory overload, and if so, what
does it mean for students encounteringmindfulness in schools. Critics argue
that: mindfulness has been uprooted from rich wisdom traditions and has
thus lost sight of its ethical orientation becoming a programmatic rather
than pedagogical practice; it is simply another element in a very profitable
self-help industry; or that when uncoupled from an ethical framework and
philosophical investigation, it engages solely with symptoms rather than
causes of suffering. Given the increasing interest in mindfulness in schools,
how ought we think about, conceptualise, and critically reflect upon the pro-
motion of mindfulness interventions in educational settings? If education
involves developing the capacity to pay attention in a creative, interested
and curious way, why is the introduction of mindfulness programmes into
schools seen as problematic by some?
The broader interest in mindfulness training initiatives may be in part due
to the psychosomatic symptoms of anxiety and stress owing to the acceler-
ated pace of life under contemporary capitalism. In the case of immaterial
labour, such as the workplace in service industries and the knowledge
economy, the capacity for flexibility, innovation, adaptation, and mobil-
ity is increasingly sought. Similar capacities are valued and privileged in
educational policy. At the same time, experiences of precariousness and
uncertainty that stem from changes in working conditions are exploited to
purportedlymaximise efficiency in theworkplace. The rise of the ‘precariat’
and an increasingly technicist vision underpinning educational systems are
not the only features of contemporary life that may have contributed to
an interest in mindfulness. Theorists like Bernard Stiegler, Franco Berardi
and N. Katherine Hayles comment upon some of the unprecedented ways
in which new technologies and media are impacting upon psychic life in
general, and in particular upon what Hayles calls ‘deep attention’. This
is because of the ways in which attention is constantly solicited through
a range of media, which in turn generates a permanent heightened state
of anticipation and alertness. Understanding the rationale for introducing
mindfulness into school settings involves understanding the broader set of
experiences of students. However, mindfulness in schools can serve to ob-
scure this context and the causes of the symptoms that such programmes
seek to redress. In the second part of this essay, I examine some of the ways
in which mindfulness has been used in corporate and military contexts,
and indicate some of the dangers of a performative, measurable, outcome
driven and narrow conception of mindfulness that is divorced from ethical
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considerations and from context. The tendency to utilise the language of
evidence for the ‘effectiveness’ of mindfulness is appraised, in particular
when such claims are invoked in order to garner epistemic credibility. I
suggest that the well-meaning efforts to secularise mindfulness, provide
scientific evidence for its effectiveness, and introduce it to wider publics
may have served to impoverish the rich contribution that practices of mind-
fulness, situated within a broader ethical framework, can make to human
lives, and arguably contribute to the educational endeavour. For example,
the emphasis on transforming inner conditions of students’ lives can lead to
the neglect of outer conditions, such as structural inequality, or unhealthy
and exploitative work practices. This can result in practices that privilege
individual wellbeing over compassion and concern for the happiness of oth-
ers, providing a buffer against loving attention to the world and others, even
if, as Oren Ergas (2014, 2013) argues that this is at odds with the expansive
ethical vision underpinning the work of Jon Kabat-Zinn (1991, 1994, 2011)
who has been so influential in the ‘mindfulness movement’.
In the final section, I ask how mindfulness in educational settings might
come to be viewed in a different light if we reflect upon the ways in which
school environments and curricula could promote mindfulness, awareness,
sensitive inquiry, and contemplative practices through the day, rather than
offering it as a discrete intervention focused on the self. Mindfulness is
not a practice that is foreign to education, so a more mindful approach to
education may restore the idea that education ought to be in service of life.
Likewise, a more holistic approach to education could invite a more expan-
sive vision of curricular subjects and a more attenuated understanding of
human embodied subjectivities. In terms of the curriculum, this could sup-
port coming to understand through experiencing the ways in which different
subjects and pedagogical practices express different material potentialities,
relational qualities, and sensibilities, as William James (2003) suggests in
his Essays in Radical Empiricism. (See Ergas, this issue, for a detailed
examination of James’ concept of attention.) Practices of education that in-
volve mindfulness could support this deepening of experience and a slower
more process oriented approach that helps to open the self to the world and
to itself.
DIAGNOSIS: THE COLLAPSE OF ATTENTION
In order to situate debates about mindfulness in schools, I wish first to ex-
amine the unprecedented ways in which attention has become both a scarce
resource and a commodity. While it could be argued that humans have al-
ways had difficulty in paying attention, the emergence of new technologies
has led to a ‘phase shift’ in the way in which humans interface with tech-
nological artefacts. This is of particular concern in the case of children and
young people and research into the implications of this for human devel-
opment is only in its infancy. A central feature of mental life, attention is
increasingly experienced in a disjointed fashion due to the ways in which
it is constantly solicited. In his polemical book Precarious Rhapsodies,
Franco Berardi offers a pessimistic diagnosis of the evolution of psychic,
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affective and sensible life under capitalism. He argues that the acceleration
and intensification of information transmission is leading to an overload of
the senses and an experience of present time that is increasingly fragmented
and discontinuous. He describes this as a mutation of capitalism, arguing
that capitalism now seeks to target directly the sphere of psychic life. The
consequences of this shift differ depending on one’s position in the eco-
nomic and social field. Such an experience is qualitatively different to that
described by Marx and Engels in their analysis of workers’ experiences of
alienation through physical labour. Hardt and Negri (2001), in their creative
interpretation of Marx, describe this colonisation of psychic and affective
life as the real subsumption of Capital.
Examining the broader context of psycho-technologies and marketing,
Berardi describes what he calls the political economy of attention. He calls
it a ‘political economy’ because of the ways in which capital operates di-
rectly upon the psyche through the colonisation of the psycho-sphere, that
is, it targets lived experience and the formation of subjectivities. This is par-
ticularly evident in the domain of attention. Capitalism through the constant
solicitation of attention through a range of media, technological tools, and
marketing strategies is connected to the brain and the nervous system. He
believes that ‘to understand the crisis of the new economy, it is necessary
to begin from the psychic experience of the virtual class’ (2009, p. 38),
suggesting that the info-sphere, the ‘interface between the media system
and the mind that receives the signals’ (p. 39) is asymmetrically structured
because ‘the universe of receivers, human brains of real people made of
flesh, fragile and sensual organs, is not formatted according to the same
standard as the system of digital transmitters’ (p. 39). The consequence of
this, he suggests, is panic, depression, attention-disturbance, hyper-activity,
solitude, existential misery, anxiety, and so on. For Berardi, this series of
pathological symptoms is a function of the accelerated digital and machinic
time of contemporary life in which subjectivity is becoming increasingly
dispersed. Humans, including children and young people, undergo expe-
riences of information overload as their attention is ceaselessly solicited
from multiple sources. He calls this ‘attentive stress’ and argues that such
constant appeals for attention reduce the time permitted for affectivity, sen-
sibility, and thinking. It becomes more and more difficult to accede to the
simple experience of being an embodied subject with its own organic tem-
porality and rhythms of existence. Narrowing the gap between stimulus and
response creates the kind of being who does not and cannot reflect, whose
experience is thinned, and who reacts rather than responds.
Philosophers like N. Katherine Hayles, Bernard Stiegler and Franco Be-
rardi who are interested in the emergence of new forms of cognitive and
affective labour and in the relationships between technics and humans are
not technophobes. They do not appeal to a nostalgic time before digi-
tal technology, but they do want to show some of the potential impli-
cations of the interface between the human organism and emergent info-
technologies. Some of their reflections are of particular interest to educators.
Hayles distinguishes between hyper-attention and deep attention. She states
that ‘hyper reading, which includes skimming, scanning, fragmenting and
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juxtaposing texts, is a strategic response to an information-intensive envi-
ronment’ adding that it correlates with ‘hyper attention, a cognitive mode
that has a low threshold for boredom, alternates flexibly between different
information streams, and prefers a high level of stimulation’ (2012, p. 12).
Deep attention, on the other hand, can maintain a single focus and has a high
threshold for boredom. She does not wish to argue that one kind of reading
is preferable to the other—each has its strengths and benefits—and hyper-
attention is useful in those information-intensive environments which many
children and students now navigate from birth. However, ‘deep attention is
a precious social achievement that took centuries even millennia to culti-
vate [ . . . ]’ (p. 99), and the increasingly rapid response times encouraged
through activities that promote hyper attention generate a dispersed and
distracted subjectivity that constantly checks emails, social media, surfs the
web, plays computer based games, and so forth, but finds it increasingly
difficult to simply ‘pay attention’.
The danger of losing the capacity for deep attention and the destruction
of the ‘juvenile psychic apparatus’ is also a worry for Bernard Stiegler. If
attention is understood in the context of the attention economy, in particular
in relation to the objects of our attention, it may help us to understand why
NewWave film director Jean-Luc Godard thought that people should be paid
for watching television: they are giving their attention and thus their time
and their lives to an apparatus that captures their consciousness. Marketing
mechanisms are devised to solicit and capture attention, and the capacity to
sustain attention is destroyed through the constant short-circuiting that for-
bids the laying hold ofmemorywhich in turn precludes the focus, awareness
and concentration required for the digestion and integration of experience.
Attention deficit is not, then, simply a psychological disorder but a feature
of contemporary life when the organism develops in an info-saturated en-
vironment. The pharmacological relationship with attention deficit disorder
diagnosis is well documented.
In respect of our topic of mindfulness in schools, in particular in relation
to attention, it is difficult to say what the cause of the current interest in,
or perceived need for, mindfulness training, might be. It could be due to
the rise in attention-related psychopathologies sketched by Berardi (2009),
Stiegler (2010, 2013) and others. It could be because technological innova-
tion, in particular fMRI scanning in the field of neuroscience, finally showed
evidence of neuroplasticity through meditation whereby the data from these
experiments provided empirical evidence for first person reports of expe-
riential change. It might be because meditation, or mindfulness, became
legitimated on the basis of credible scientific evidence through its incorpo-
ration into health institutional structures. Or it may be due to a confluence
of factors. Whatever the case may be, it is interesting to reflect upon the
ways in which mindfulness and the arguments for its utility, in particular
in corporate and educational contexts, tend to be framed without explicit
reference to, or serious consideration of, the implications of the colonisa-
tion of the ‘attention economy’ and the motivations that draw people and
organisations into engagingwithmindfulness programmes, includingMind-
fulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) and Mindfulness Based Cognitive
C© 2015 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.
192 A. O’Donnell
Therapy (MBCT). There is insufficient examination of ‘outer’ conditions,
the causes of the collapse of the capacity for attention and the implications
of this for lived experience. Finally, ‘capitalist spirituality’ extends the mar-
ket mechanism and economic rationality into the domain of human beliefs,
desire, subjective life and lived experience.
AN APPARATUS OF CAPTURE?
Practices of mindfulness are seen to be helpful in responding to and cre-
atively resisting some of the consequences of the prevalence of attention
deficit in contemporary life, as outlined by Stiegler and Berardi. However,
practices of mindfulness may also be re-territorialised, to use a trope of
Deleuze and Guattari (1987), or co-opted into existing regimes in such a
way that the revolutionary, transformative or liberatory potentials of such
practices are diminished. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) describe mechanisms
to tame these potentials by using the language of ‘apparatus of capture’.
This concept is useful when reflecting upon ‘technical’ and instrumental
approaches to attention formation. Neuroscientists and cognitive scientists
have been particularly interested in researching how meditative practice
brings about the ‘re-wiring’ of the brain’s circuitry, in part because this
shows evidence of neuro-plasticity and the ways in which experience shapes
physiological processes. Other related fields of new research attentive to the
problematic implications of human engagement with new technology is be-
ing undertaken in areas like cyber-psychology that seek to examine the
effects on children and young people of prolonged periods of interfacing
with digital media. One perhaps unintended effect of ‘the turn within’, be it
through the rise of the self-help industry, cognitive behavioural techniques,
or even mindfulness programmes, has meant that those more radical or sys-
temic critiques that attend to and evaluate the outer conditions that shape
people’s inner and psychic lives are given less and less weight. Yet, ap-
proaches to ‘mindfulness’ that teach people how to ‘surf’ their uncertainties
and anxieties without seeking to understand or become aware of the causes
of suffering are at odds with the Buddhist origins of these practices which
seek to develop the understanding of the causes of suffering and to cultivate
compassion, ethical skilfulness, judgement, right action, and right view.
In corporate mindfulness in particular, the focus is explicitly on managing
‘inner conditions’ without critical interrogation of the workplace. In this
respect, mindfulness techniques are seen as useful tools in alleviating or
mitigating those very symptoms of stress, anxiety, depression that have, as
argued above, have increased in recent times.
James Reveley (2014) addresses the burgeoning interest in mindfulness
training in light of advances in research in neuro-plasticity. He asks whether
we are ‘pathology-proofing’ children or empowering them, saying that
typically such programmes are presented as methods for training which
enable self-regulation, attentional skills, stress reduction and supportive
aids for general wellbeing and they tend to be offered without further
investigation of the causes and conditions of stress, anxiety or a broader
symptomatology. In short, there is little critical investigation of the reasons
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that bring many people to mindfulness, often through Mindfulness Based
Stress Reducation (MBSR) courses. Reveley rightly, in my view, situates
these programmes within the context of ‘digital capitalism and the social
pathologies it generates’ (2014, p. 3). He argues that Jon Kabat-Zinn’s
transposition of mindfulness from Buddhism into the scientific (and
secularized) domain of ‘medico-psychological discourse’ has inadvertently
supported the image of mindfulness as a form of neuro-enhancement,
although he also acknowledges Kabat-Zinn’s own concerns about and
analysis of an ‘entire society [suffering] from attention deficit disorder’
(Kabat-Zinn quoted in Reveley, 2014, p. 4). Bluntly put, Reveley believes
that mindfulness serves as a vital instrument for pathology-proofing young
people today, constituting, in this respect, a societal safety-valve. I think
that in many respects Reveley’s analysis is correct, nonetheless I wish to
keep an open-mind in respect of the potential benefits of such a ‘band-aid’,
even if it allows simply for marginally different and more open experiences
of the relation to oneself and the world. Indeed, such an experience may
have effects not anticipated by the original rationale for the introduction
of such programmes, or by the person engaging in such practices. For
instance, there is evidence (Condon et al., 2013) that engagement in MBSR
courses increases compassionate responses to suffering. In the last section,
I will explore the question of how mindfulness in schools might open up
richer and more creative possibilities of experience in greater detail.
If we stay with our critical evaluation for the moment, it should be noted
thatmindfulness is a commodity sold to and through a variety of institutional
settings, rather than the practice of offering teachings as a gift and students
respond with generosity or dana as originally envisioned and practiced in
Buddhism. The commercial dimension to the introduction of mindfulness
in schools is important if we wish to critically reflect upon the diversity
of reasons for the promotion of and justification for such programmes.
Nicholas Rose’s comments, both on the way in which life has come to
be seen as a project and how one’s identity is now seen as something to
be managed, shed some light on this. He believes that ‘characteristic of
advanced democracies [is that life as a project] is constitutively linked to
the rise of a breed of new spiritual directors, “engineers of the human soul”’,
adding ‘[a]lthough our subjectivity might appear our most intimate sphere
of experience, its contemporary intensification as a political and ethical
value is intrinsically correlated with the growth of expert languages, which
enable us to render our relations with our selves and others into words and
into thought, [ . . . ] with expert techniques, which promise to allow us to
transform ourselves in the direction of happiness and fulfilment’ (1996,
p. 157). Likewise, Nigel Thrift describes New Age training in corporate
environments, noting that executives from ‘the Bank of England, British
Gas, Ernst andWhinney,Mars and Legal andGeneral’ (2005, p. 42) have all
been given lessons in how to do the Whirling Dervish dance. It should not
be forgotten that such initiatives are devised with the intent of developing
creativity, efficiency, innovation and ultimately profitability. Yet, this also
reveals the underside of the intensification of capital and its toll on workers
at all levels of organisations. Thrift writes ‘what is interesting about current
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management literature, from the popular to the academic, is the amount of
space given over to the stresses and strains of being a member of the new
economy: sometimes it seems that all that managers have found are ways
to oppress themselves as well as their workers’, quoting John Perry Barlow
‘“How thin can I spread myself before I am no longer ‘there’?”’ (p. 152).
In other words, the variety of self-help interventions available to workers
is not effective because the conditions in which they work militate against
alleviation of the symptoms through such interventions.
Ed Halliwell, co-director of the Mindfulness Initiative supporting the UK
All-Parliamentary Inquiry Group on Mindfulness, is cognisant of concerns
about the decontextualised operationalisation of mindfulness, the criticisms
about the lack of ethical framework in mindfulness initiatives, and the lack
of regulation of mindfulness training. He writes that ‘mindfulness trains
compassion—bringing kindness to experience is what distinguishes this
from the concentration and balance of the unfeeling sniper’ (Halliwell, 2014)
and argues that ‘part of the challenge for the field, and for the Parliamentary
inquiry, is to meet the openness to workplace mindfulness in artful ways
that neither collude with mindlessness in corporate cultures nor alienate
those working within them’ (Halliwell, 2014).
The effort to introduce mindfulness to the military underlines the ethical
complexity of this movement to introduce mindfulness to diverse groups.
Elizabeth Stanley and Amishi Jha have been instrumental in developing
a mindfulness programme for the military called Mindfulness-based Mind
Fitness Training (MMFT, Stanley et al., 2011). Stanley (2014) details her
motivation for initiating MMFT through her own experiences of mindful-
ness awareness practices. I quote from her essay at length,
My definition of warriors is inclusive: anyone who serves their com-
munities in high stress contexts, including members of the military,
law enforcement and other first-response organisations. As an aca-
demic who teaches and writes about international security, I be-
lieved that mindfulness and body-based self-regulation skills could
help with the cognitive degradation (well-documented in empirical re-
search) associated with military stress-inoculation training. I believe
it might help troops regulate their ANS [autonomic nervous system]
and thus function more effectively while deployed. In military circles,
this is called the ‘strategic corporal’ concept, where an individual’s
choices or actions while deployed have tremendous effects on the na-
tion’s ability to achieve its strategic goals. I also believed it might
shield troops—and their families—against health disorders and be-
havioural symptoms of the stress system after returning home (http://
www.inquiringmind.com/Articles/CultivatingMindOfWarrior.html).
The evidence that scientific research brings from studies with civilians sug-
gested, they argue, that mindfulness training could ‘optimise warrior perfor-
mance by cultivating competencies critical for modern battlefield, such as
improved self-regulation, better attentional skills, and enhanced situational
awareness’ (Stanley and Jha, 2009, p. 148). There is no consideration of
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ahimsa, the Sanskrit term for the Buddhist precept of non-harming or non-
violence that permeates ethics (sı¯la in Sanskrit), other than the invocation of
mindfulness’ contribution to harm reduction in that there will be a decreased
likelihood that the wrong target will be accidentally killed if the capacity
for self-regulation and so forth is developed. Hyland (this volume) offers a
careful critique of the militarisation of mindfulness and of what have been
called McMindfulness programmes (Purser, 2014; Purser and Loy, 2013).
RETURNING TO THE ETHICAL ROOTS OF MINDFULNESS
The original pragmatic and ethical effort to secularise Buddhist practices,
initiated in order to help alleviate the suffering of those who might not oth-
erwise engage with meditation within a more explicitly ethically-oriented
wisdom tradition, was, I believe, of real value, and I acknowledge the con-
tinued importance of embeddingMBSR andMBCT in health organisations.
However, an unintended consequence of providing the scientific evidence
to demonstrate the effectiveness of mindfulness as an intervention is the
impoverishment of the ways in which the practice is communicated and its
value explained, in particular when it is instrumentalised as a technique pri-
marily focused on the self rather than as part of an ethical practice and way
of life. This is not universally the case and there are a number of thoughtful
pieces on mindfulness in education that articulate a more holistic and rich
understanding of the practice. For example, theClinical Handbook of Mind-
fulness offers a set of considered reflections that show the importance of
depth of practice and ethical integrity. Indeed, mind and heart are the same
words in a number of Asian languages, and the translation of mindfulness
into heartfulness communicates the compassionate roots and orientation of
the practice.
In Kabat-Zinn’s foreword to that book, he reiterates his belief that mind-
fulness has universal value and hewrites of ‘our intrinsic capacity to embody
the full potential of our species [ . . . ] for wakefulness, clarity and wisdom’
(2009, p. xxvi). Rather than the language of cognition, he prefers awareness,
and he emphasises that mindfulness is only one factor in the Noble Eightfold
Path, the meaning of which continues to be debated. He explains that his
definition ‘paying attention, in a particular way, on purpose, in the present
moment and non-judgementally’ is an operational one, and ‘it leaves the
full dimensionality and impact of mindfulness or mindful awareness im-
plicit and available for ongoing inquiry and investigation [ . . . ]’ (p. xxvii).
Mindfulness is aim, method, practice and outcome, and its non-striving
orientation is not ‘performative’ or outcome-driven but rather emphasises
‘nowhere to go, nothing to do and nothing to attain’ (p. xxix). The embod-
ied, living, and vital presence of the mindfulness teacher as practitioner, and
the sensitivity of the meditator and teacher to the complexity and richness
of first-person experience ought not, he argues, be supplanted by a ‘custom-
ary manualised approach to the delivery of psychological interventions’ (p.
xxxii). A further difficulty faced by those who wish to help others share
the experience of mindful living is, as we have seen, that ‘conventional
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scientific methods may not easily lend themselves to a refined exploration
of mindfulness’ (Grossman and Van Dam, 2011, p. 220).
It is with this in mind that I would like to explore a more expansive
understanding of mindfulness as part of a holistic practice, an ethics and
a philosophy, rather than simply a tool or technique. I do so in order to
invite further reflection upon experience, embodied subjectivity, context,
sensibility and ethics in education. At present, mindfulness is in danger
of being co-opted into the ‘evidence-based’, ‘what works’ agenda that has
proven so problematic for many of us working in educational settings, as,
by prioritising performative indicators and valuing only that which can
be measured, risks instrumentalising what is a rich existential and ethical
practice and using inappropriate forms of evaluation (Van Damm et al.,
2009). Terry Hyland (this issue) examines this question in some detail.
Such a practice that allows us to explore what it means to be a sensible,
cognising, moving, perceiving, embodied, ethical being can support the
holistic education of the young. Indeed, Kabat-Zinn writes, ‘Mindfulness
can only be understood from the inside out. It is not one more cognitive-
behavioural technique to be deployed in a behaviour change paradigm but
a way of being and a way of seeing that has profound implications for
understanding our own minds and bodies, and for living life as if it really
mattered’ (2011, p. 284).
CREATING LITTLE SPACES IN EVERYDAY LIFE: ATTENTION AND
EDUCATION
Despite the detailed critiques of mindfulness interventions that I have out-
lined above, mindfulness might also be described as a Trojan Horse that
needed to be disguised in order to be permitted entry into those institutions
and organisations that would otherwise be wary of anything that might be
viewed as ideological or religious, or those institutions that accept only
interventions premised upon experimental scientific evidence. Despite the
reservations that I have outlined about the dangers of reducing mindfulness
to a set of techniques or prescriptions that can be operationalised, I remain
positive about the introduction of mindfulness into schools and supportive
of creative ways of developing institutional cultures that cultivate mind-
fulness in students and teachers. This is because such practices develop
the capacity for creative and deep attention, which helps to support greater
clarity, non-reactivity and ethical sensitivity, as well a richer experience of
life. Even if the critics are right that the translation of these practices into
secularised, operational techniques fail to explore and value the ethical and
wisdom traditions of which mindfulness is but one element, when it comes
to schools, it should be remembered that mindfulness involves, as critics
acknowledge, simply beginner practices that allow for a taste of some ele-
ments of complex and rich wisdom traditions. Rather than being concerned
about fidelity to such wisdom traditions, the more important question may
be: do students feel that their encounters with mindfulness help them to
live? Do such encounters enrich the quality of their lives and encourage
compassionate relationships with others? If the response is that they do,
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this also raises a set of further questions about responsibility for the outer
conditions of students’ lives, in particular if these damage their wellbeing.
These could include a careful examination of the conditions of schooling
and the institutions in which children spend so much time.
Taking mindfulness seriously would also bring us to ask what role in-
stitutional and school cultures have in creating problems experienced by
many young people, the problems that mindfulness seeks to retrospectively
address. Do schools themselves provide supportive environments for mind-
ful existences and experiences? Do practices, institutional structures and
objectives and aims in education create stress, comparison or anxiety? Do
schools offer the opportunity for student voice and participation? What
is the risk that mindfulness programmes will simply be used in order to
‘pathology-proof’ students, inoculating them against stress, and paralysing
opportunities for critique and resistance whilst refusing to examine the role
of schools and educational policy in creating some of the suffering that
mindfulness interventions are supposed to alleviate? However, if schools
genuinely recognise and acknowledge the benefits of mindfulness, includ-
ing the joys of attentive awareness and the existence of the suffering of
students, then this may lead to a more radical critique of schooling. This
could invite careful examination of the responsibility of educational poli-
cymakers and of schools themselves in cultivating cultures and curricula to
create ‘outer conditions’ that are more supportive to students and teachers
in their efforts to develop more subtle, nuanced, open practices of atten-
tion and compassionate awareness. I suggest that it is insufficient, and even
unethical, to focus solely on ‘inner conditions’ if such changes to ‘outer
conditions’ can be made. Indeed, arguably it is near futile to persist in ‘add-
on’ interventions if broader systemic, cultural and organisational changes
do not accompany efforts to develop mindfulness amongst students. Even
simple questions like the following are important in this respect: do students
and teachers feel as though the curriculum is rushed through or alien to their
lives? Are students and teachers subjected to audit cultures premised upon
control that emphasise outcomes and performativity rather than giving them
the space to be, reflect and find their own voices?
Mindfulness is concerned with ‘non-doing’ and with ‘how things are’,
says Jon Kabat-Zinn. So too, teaching mindfulness means responding to
‘where people are at’, helping them to bring the quality of attention into their
lives through practices that are most appropriate to their lives and situations.
Asking the question, ‘to what do I ordinarily give my attention?’ helps us
to understand what we value in our lives, and perhaps to make us more
aware that our attention is, in fact, oriented in ways that are at odds with our
values or ideals, or even how the quality of our attention, or objects of our
attention, militate against developing a deeper awareness of, and attunement
to, the nature of our experience. Part of the practice of mindfulness involves
‘an appeal to the subject’s quality of mindfulness as the application of
an objective stance in the face of his own subjectivity’ (Ergas, 2014, p.
64). This, again paradoxically, cultivates a richer relationship to one’s own
experience as one investigates it and inquires into it with compassionate
curiosity, rather than living out one’s habits through repetitive and broadly
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unconscious patterns of behaviour or engaging inadvertently in compulsive
thinking or ‘mind-wandering’ (Ergas, 2013, p. 276).
Deploying more heterodox methods inspired by mindfulness practices
rooted in the Buddhist tradition, that are both integrated into the curriculum
and school experience, and appropriate to the needs of children and young
people may be what will be of most service in schools. Although arguments
are often made against permeated approaches because of its attention to ex-
perience, an on-going permeated approach to mindfulness in schools may
be more helpful than simply discrete interventions, even if initial training in
mindfulness may be required for students. Here we return to the theme with
which this essay began: paying attention. Although attention is only one
element of the Noble Eightfold Path, developing the capacity for creative
attention in schools may open up different potentials for sensibility, care,
and richness of experience simply because the temporality and openness of
the act of attention interrupts habitual associations and invites a spacious-
ness and non-reactivity into experience. Teaching is seldom served well
by generic and formulaic methodologies or by pedagogies divorced from
philosophical and ethical principles, and so it may be that the problem lies
only in those ‘ready-made’ or ‘generic’ approaches to mindfulness teach-
ing that are not attuned to the dynamics and potentials of a singular class,
that seek prescribed outcomes, that seek to be ‘neutral’ rather than honest
about the ethical and spiritual origins of the practice, and that fail to intuit
those unpredictable moments that can invite insight and transformation.
Where mindfulness techniques meet creative pedagogy, contemplative in-
quiry and the kind of unselfing that education involves through the way
that it brings our careful attention to something other than ourselves, this
may allow for mutual transformation of all of these practices. Minimalist,
exploratory, philosophical, creative, sensitive and speculative approaches
to mindfulness are also indicative of good teaching, and it is this that may
be of most benefit in thinking about how schools and classrooms are to
become more mindful. If policy-makers and experts are serious about the
value of mindfulness, it cannot be ‘velcroed’ onto existing curricula and
institutions, especially if current pedagogical practice or institutional cul-
tures undermine the development of the capacity for mindfulness, attention,
awareness and compassion.
It is at this point that I will bring together the wisdom and philosophical
traditions of East and West by reflecting upon the relationship between at-
tention, unselfing and education. The position I map is, in certain respects,
rather different from that of Ergas (this issue) in respect of the value placed
on the ‘out there’. Whilst thus far in this essay, the discussion of practices
of attention has been rooted in approaches to mindfulness with Buddhist
origins, attention was also the theme that lay at the heart of Simone Weil’s
philosophy, a thinker influenced by religious and philosophical thought
from Greece to India, who explicitly related attention to study in her essay
‘Reflection on the Right Use of School Studies with a View to the Love
of God’ (in Weil, 1959). She saw developing the habit of attention as an
essential ethical practice and as such for her it lay at the heart of the ped-
agogical endeavour. Just as importantly in the context of this essay is the
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way in which throughout her writings she understood attention in renun-
ciative terms, distinguishing it from an exercise of the will, concentration
or strained muscular effort, and describing it instead as a kind of waiting
without expectation that involves renouncing oneself to make space for the
other to which one attends. Her metaphors presenting attention as a kind
of seeing or reading find their origins in part in the Platonic image of the
sun that shines impartially on all existents, regardless of whether they are
good or evil. Attention, or love, involves really looking, really seeing. In
this story, this exercise of ‘reading’ is a kind of waiting and accepting. Like
vision, attention needs an intimate distance. One cannot see when one is too
close—one loses oneself in the object of one’s attention, over-identifying
or fusing with it, just as one cannot see when one is too far. Just as the sun’s
rays illuminate without discrimination, to accept that the other is, and to
accept that other as it, he or she is, without wanting to change that other,
provides the substance for a relation of attention. She writes, ‘attention
consists of suspending our thought, leaving it detached, empty, and ready
to be penetrated by the object’ (1959, p. 111). Although it initially requires
persistence, striving and effort to maintain the discipline, it gradually comes
to fill the mind. This is not an attitude of cold objectivity but rather it illu-
minates whatever is the object of attention with love—indeed attention is
a form of love for Weil. She says, ‘Attention consists of suspending one’s
thought, leaving it detached, empty and ready to be penetrated by the ob-
ject’ (1959, p. 112). Through an apprenticeship in paying attention, waiting
without expectation, and accepting ‘what is’ and ‘how it is’, one begins
to purify oneself of those projections, fantasies, and reactive strivings that
typify much human existence. Iris Murdoch (2001, p. 52) calls the human
tendency toward possession and narcissism, the ‘fat relentless ego’.
It seems peculiar to espouse such the renunciatory ethic of kenosis, in
particular when contemporary educational discourses so often emphasise
capabilities, flourishing and self-development, but in a confessional and
correctional culture, it might be wise to resist the temptation to focus solely
on the self and mindfulness discourses are often positioned as a kind of
‘self-help’. Weil thinks of attention as always attending to something or
something other. It is relational, opening us to what is not us. One waits,
one attends to something or someone that is not oneself. The creation of
distance, a loving distance, is at the heart of the relation of attention and
helps one to come to ‘see things as they are’. This renunciative movement
is what she calls ‘decreation’ (Weil, 1956, 2002). Attention involves the
greatest of efforts, but a ‘negative effort’ (1959, p. 110). When we reflect
upon the role of attention in education, it can be helpful to reflect upon
those contemplative, educational spaces that cultivate the conditions for
forms of intimate or loving distances that involve this kind of ‘decreation’,
contemplation or waiting that Weil sees as creative attention. Attention is,
in her view, both the substance of the ethical relation in its higher form, and
proto-ethical as one cultivates and develops practices of paying attention.
So, is it possible to develop contemplative pedagogical practices that support
deep attention and creative attention?
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Keeping in mind Weil’s writings on renunciatory ethics, studying and
the importance of developing the habit of attention might help mindful-
ness programmes in schools to sustain a sense of openness in practice that
remembers to also turn outward to beings other than oneself, helping to
de-centre the self, and intensifying contact with reality through the practice
of attending to rather than getting mired in the projections and fantasies of
the self. Even one’s own body, sensations and breath can be attended to
in an ‘impersonal’ way that paradoxically opens up experience in a way
that feels liberating. Fortunately, the practice of paying attention is also,
oftentimes, a joyful one, even if it runs counter to fundamental narcissistic
human tendencies to imagine and possess. At aminimum,mindfulness prac-
tices and practices of attention and contemplation that meet with creative
pedagogies can support lives that are a little less reactive, more creatively
responsive to ‘what is’, more capable of being reflective, appreciative and
grateful for simply existing, and curious, and more interested in the nature
of their experience and in the world in which they live. Oddly, practices that
support giving one’s attention can provide a useful counter-balance to those
therapeutic practices and psychological discourses that centre on the self.
Given the emphasis on outcomes and ‘what works’ in educational research
more broadly and in mindfulness practice in particular, it is important to
underline the paradox of the practice: maintaining the discipline of a prac-
tice, whilst not striving for specific outcomes and not being wilful in one’s
efforts may be more likely to support transformation in someone’s life, just
as not focusing on learning outcomes in pedagogy, may invite approaches
that are more mindful and contemplative, allowing for the kind of deep
attention and experiential engagement that supports learning.
Of course, many of the approaches to mindfulness in schools chime
with good teaching, in particular those holistic approaches that seek to
deepen experiential inquiry and investigation that are motivated by what
Arthur Zajonc (2009) calls ‘an epistemology of love’. Curricula framed as
MBSR for children often offer more expansive, philosophical and creative
methodologies than might be expected. Even mindfulness practices that
stay at the level of what Richard Shusterman (2008) calls somaesthetic
practices, such as noticing the rise and fall of one’s breath without explicit
ethical exploration, may allow for ‘breathing spaces’ in schools and an ethos
that values this spaciousness. Saltzman and Goldin’s creation of an MBSR
curriculum invites philosophical speculation from children ‘What does dead
feel like?’ They answered, ‘like a swan’, ‘like an angel’, or ‘like floating’
(2008, p. 141). Like adult approaches to mindfulness that begin with a body-
scan, awareness of bodily experience can be experienced through Seaweed
Practice, an exercise that invites children to slowly move their bodies like
seaweed floating under water. Another example is the Thought-Parade, an
exercise of imagining one’s thoughts are walking by. This was designed to
support the practice of observing one’s thoughts without identifying with
them or reacting to them. Children are even asked to do ‘Thoreau’ walks as
a form of walking meditation. Finding ways for children to inquire into and
articulate their experience can be difficult, so the idea of ‘funny mind’ is
mobilised to help children remember that thoughts are just thoughts and they
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pop in and out of our heads. And thinking of someone you love and sending
love to that person or being is a way of translating the loving-kindness
meditation into the life of the child.
As Hooker and Fodor (2008) also point out, often children are closer to
being naturally mindful in their everyday lives than adults so they offer dif-
ferent kinds of exercises to encourage mindfulness like drawing an object
in greater and greater detail, which involves a practice of deep looking. The
difficulty with framing mindfulness in schools in terms of stress reduction
is that it fails to capture the pedagogical and broader experiential potentials
of the practice. What SimoneWeil’s philosophy of attention shares with ap-
proaches to teaching mindfulness is the paradoxical sense that de-centring
the self through different practices of attention can invite a richer sense of
one’s own experience, a deeper knowledge of the world, and compassion
for others. Perhaps it might be wise to be less worried about the authenticity
of secularised versions of mindfulness, and more concerned by how we can
make schools more mindful places which marry the most creative pedago-
gies with the insights of mindful practice and creative practices of attention,
helping us to reflect oncemore on the existential questions that philosophers
of education have posed for so long: what do we hope for from education?
What do we value in education? What are the ends of education, and how
do our means support those ends? However, without the sense of a wider
context and critical discourses about education and the attention economy,
mindfulness practice in schools that is limited to brief interventions within
a wider curriculum, or which takes place within school cultures that foster
thoughtlessness and carelessness rather than mindfulness, may end up at
best ‘pathology-proofing’ the young, rather than demonstrating real care
for them.
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